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Articles

A

PRIVATIZATION SOLUTION TO THE
LEGITIMACY OF PREPETITION WAIVERS OF
TIE AUTOMATIC STAY
Edward S. Adams* and James L. Baillie**

On April 13, 1988, the Club Tower Limited Partnership ("Debtor")
entered into a loan agreement with the Teacher Retirement System of Texas
("TRST") to finance the purchase of a luxury apartment building.' C & S
National Bank ("Bank"); which held the interim note used to finance
construction of the building, transferred the financing note to TRST. As
security for the financing note, the Bank also transferred the Debtor's Deed to
Secure Debt, Security Agreement, and Financing Statement to TRST.2 This
gave TRST a first-priority lien against the Debtor's interest in the property and
a security interest in all the Debtor's contracts, rents, and proceeds arising from
the operation of the apartment building.
Beginning in 1990, the Debtor defaulted on its payments to TRST. After
negotiating a workout, the parties entered into a forbearance agreeme#ht in
February 1991, by which TRST agreed to refrain from foreclosing on the
property if the Debtor could raise $1,000,000 in new equity to cover interest
payments of the loan and predicted operating deficits.3 As part of the
forbearance agreement, the Debtor agreed that TRST would be entitled to
immediate relief from the automatic stay in the event that the Debtor filed for
bankruptcy. In exchange for this forbearance, the Debtor also agreed to deposit
with an escrow agent a deed to the property conveying all of its interest in the
property to TRST. The escrow agent was instructed to give the deed to TRST

* Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Law and Business
Studies, University of Minnesota Law School. J.D., University of Chicago Law School; B.A.,
Knox College.
* * Partner and Co-Chair of Bankruptcy Group, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota. J.D., University of Chicago Law School; A.B., University of
Chicago. Excerpts of this Article are taken from Mikel R. Bistrow &James L. Baille, Waiver of
Bankruptcy Protections in Pre-Bankruptcy Workout Agreements, in BUSINESS WORKOUTS
MANUAL (Donald L. Rome ed., 2d ed. 1995).

We are indebted to Daniel A. Farber for his comments. Our thanks also to Dan Fisher
and Margaret Crawford for their invaluable and tireless research assistance.
1. In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 308 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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in the event the Debtor could not raise the new
capital by May 31, 1991. TRST
4
subsequently extended the deadline one week.
On June 6, 1991, the Debtor, whose only asset was the apartment
building, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. 5 TRST asked the court to lift
the automatic stay because the Debtor had specifically agreed to waive the
protection of the stay by agreeing to transfer the deed to TRST in the event
the
6
Debtor could not raise the capital to service the debt-which it could not.
The Debtor argued that the enforcement of the forbearance agreement
would deprive it of one of the most important protections bankruptcy gives
debtors-time to arrange a reorganization plan. TRST, on the other hand,
argued the court should bind the Debtor to the agreement and the Debtor
should not be able to take advantage of the bankruptcy protections to shelter an
7
asset in contravention of their express agreement.
Who prevailed and why? In this instance, the court held for TRST.8 The
court noted that by lifting the stay, it was not depriving the Debtor of all
bankruptcy protections but only the protection of the stay, and only with regard
to this one creditor. 9 The court further found that the Debtor did not waive its
right to file a bankruptcy petition, but only waived the right to one aspect of
bankruptcy, the automatic stay.10 Finally, the court concluded that the Debtor
already received a benefit from the stay because the stay was in effect from the
time of the filing until the time of the court's decision."
The factual scenario described above is not an uncommon one, When a
corporate debtor defaults on an obligation to a lender, the two parties will often
attempt to renegotiate the loan agreement to give the debtor a chance to cure
the default. Lenders have come to see these "workout" agreements as an
opportunity to obtain concessions from the debtor that would adversely affect
the debtor's legal position in any subsequent bankruptcy filing by the debtor.
Typically, the lender demands that the debtor agree to waive or modify
protections it would gain by filing a petition for relief with the bankruptcy
court. 12 Additionally, the lender will usually demand a stipulation of admissions
4.
5.

Id.at 309.
Id.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 310.
8. Id. at 312.
9. In reality, the apartment building was the only asset of the partnership and TRST was
the only secured creditor. Id. Accordingly, while the debtor may be able to avail itself of the
other protections offered through bankruptcy, this is of little solace to the single-asset debtor.
See also In re Hudson Manor Partners, No. 91-81065HR, 1991 WL 472592 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
Dec. 31, 1991).
10. Club Tower, 138 B.R. at3ll.
11. Id.
12. Such waivers include: a waiver of the right to file bankruptcy, a waiver of the right to
discharge, a waiver of the automatic stay protection with respect to an asset or assets, and a
waiver of the right to propose a bankruptcy reorganization under terms that differ from those
specified in the workout agreement.
A typical acknowledgement and relief from stay waiver might provide as follows:
The parties hereby acknowledge and agree as follows:
a.
Borrower is obligated to lender under the [loandocuments];
b.
The amount owing by Borrower to Lender under the note is currently
C.
The loan evidenced by the loan documents is and has been in default since
no later than [Date];
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from the debtor which can, if necessary, be entered into the record in support
of the waiver. Some have suggested that a lender's failure to obtain these

concessions from a debtor constitutes attorney negligence. 13 Because a

creditor's ability to avoid the automatic stay can have serious financial
consequences, many creditors have begun to condition loans on the debtor's

consent to waive the automatic stay should the debtor file for bankruptcy-14
leaving it to the bankruptcy courts to determine the validity of such waivers.

The most common waiver of bankruptcy rights, usually found in real
estate loan workout agreements, is a waiver of the protection of the automatic

stay. 15 The automatic stay is one of the most important provisions of the

Bankruptcy Code. Upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition, § 362(a) operates
immediately to prevent the debtor's creditors from taking essentially any action
against the debtor or the bankruptcy estate, subject to the exceptions in §

362(b). It applies to all entities and operates to stay:
(1) the commencement or continuation of judicial, administrative, or
other action againist the debtor;
(2) the enforcement of a prepetition judgment against the debtor;
(3) any act to obtain possession of or control over any property of the
estate;
(4) the creation or perfection of a lien against any property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create or perfect a lien against any property of the
debtor to the extent the lien secures a claim that arose prepetition;
(6) any act to collect a prepetition debt;
d.

Borrower's obligations under the loan documents are secured by [Real

Property];
e.
There is no equity in the [Real Property];the approximate value of the
[Real Property]is $_;_
;
f.
Borrower and Lender have agreed to defer exercise of Lender's remedies
until [Date] solely to give Borrower an opportunity to sell [Real Property] and if a
sale does not occur by [Date], Borrower will deed [Real Property]to Lender,
g.
But for the forbearance and other concessions made by lender under this
agreement, Borrower would have no ability to reorganize its affairs;
h.
Any bankruptcy filing by Borrower would be for the sole purpose of
delaying lender in the exercise of its remedies, and therefore would be in bad
faith; and
i.
Lender shall be entitled to relief from the automatic stay imposed by 11
U.S.C. § 362 on or against the exercise of any and all rights and remedies
available to lender under this agreement or the loan documents upon the filing of a
bankruptcy case by or against Borrower; Borrower shall not oppose any motion
for relief from the automatic stay brought by Lender.
Bistrow & Baille, supra note **, 1 21.10, § 21-13 (1995 Cumulative Supp.).
13. See Craig Auerbach, Bankruptcy Issues: Emphasizing Drafting Considerationsin
Protecting Against Insolvency, C950 ALI-ABA 303, 316-17 (citing Peter S. Partee, The
Enforceability ofPrepetitionWaivers ofa Debtor'sRights Under the Automatic Stay, NORTON
BANKR. L. ADVISOR, Nov. 1992, at 5, 10) ("more courts are likely to adopt the view that
prepetition waivers of the automatic stay are enforceable in bankruptcy, and lenders' counsel
may expose themselves to allegations of negligence by not recommending the use of such
waivers in original loan documents and in workout agreements").
14. Peter S. Partee, The Enforceability of Prepetition Waivers of a Debtor's Rights
Under the Automatic Stay, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Nov. 1992, at 5-6.
15. Scotta E. McFarland, Waivers of Bankruptcy Rights in Workout Agreements, 8 Dec.
PROB. & PROP. 15 (1994).
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(7) the setoff of any debt owed to the estate that arose prepetition; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of any proceeding before the
U.S. Tax Court regarding the debtor.16
With very limited exceptions, the automatic stay prohibits the
commencement or continuation of creditor actions against the debtor. 7
The stay is "automatic" because it is triggered upon a debtor's filing of
a bankruptcy petition regardless of whether a debtor's creditors are
aware that the debtor has filed such a petition. Once the stay is triggered,
it "continues until the bankruptcy case is closed, dismissed, or discharge
is granted or denied,
or until the bankruptcy court grants some relief
8
from the stay."'
The court may lift or otherwise alter the stay for cause, including the lack of
adequate protection, or if the debtor does not have equity in the property in
question and it is not necessary to an effective reorganization.19
The automatic stay's role in bankruptcy cannot be overstated. 20 Upon the
filing of a bankruptcy petition, § 362(a) operates immediately to prevent the
debtor's creditors from taking essentially any action against the debtor or the
bankruptcy estate. As drafted, the provision is broad, and bankruptcy courts
have not hesitated to expand its scope even further. 21 However, the stay only
affects prepetition claims and claims that could have been brought prepetition. 22
Postpetition claims are only stayed to the extent that a holder of a claim
attempts to enforce them against property of the estate. 23
Several fundamental policy rationales support enforcement of the
automatic stay. First, the stay of creditor action provides a "breathing spell" for
the debtor. It stops collection actions and harassment, thereby providing the
debtor some relief and also the opportunity to work out a payment plan or
reorganization. 24 Second, the stay prevents the disorderly liquidation or
dismemberment of the estate. Without the stay, chaos could reign upon the
filing of bankruptcy. Third, the stay protects creditors from a race of diligence
to the courthouse. Absent the stay, some creditors could gain preference over
others by being the first to execute their claims against the debtor's property.25

16.
17.

See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
See id. § 362(b).

18. William Bassin, Why CourtsShould Refuse to Enforce Pre-PetitionAgreements that
Waive Bankruptcy's Automatic Stay Provision,28 IND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994) (citing Maritime

Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1991), and NLT Computer
Servs. v. Capital Computer Sys., 755 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985)).

19.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

21.

See, e.g., In re Litchfield Co., 135 B.R. 797 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (staying actions

20. Section 362(a) is also one of the most litigated provisions in the Bankruptcy Code.
ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 286 (2d ed. 1989).

against the debtor's partners in a limited partnership). See also United States v. Richards, 994
F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Wilson, 974 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1992); In re G.S.F.
Corp., 938 F.2d 1467 (1st Cir. 1991).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 362; Robin E. Phelan & Stacey Jernigan, Solomon's Condensed:
Current Developments Regarding the Section 362 Automatic Stay, 650 PLYComm 7 (PLI

Order No. A4-4408 (1993)).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
24. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6296-97.
25.

Id.
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Despite the many obvious benefits, the automatic stay can also be
detrimental to creditors. Unsecured creditors are prevented from obtaining
judgments and executing against the debtor's property due to the stay. These
creditors are left with unsecured claims which ultimately amount to very little
in bankruptcy. 26 Undersecured creditors are prohibited from foreclosing on the
debtor's collateral-thus they lose the time value of money for the period
between the time of possible foreclosure and eventual payment by the
bankruptcy trustee. Unlike oversecured creditors, undersecured creditors can
27
receive no interest payments from the bankruptcy estate for their claim.
Finally, even oversecured creditors may desire a lifting of the stay to foreclose
on collateral so as to assure their interest is adequately protected.
Courts that have considered the enforceability of prepetition waivers and
stipulations granting relief from the automatic stay have disagreed as to what
effect they should be given.2 8 The courts' analysis and treatment of these
waivers have been anything but uniform. This inconsistency leaves the status of
waivers uncertain at best. Moreover, the myriad of possible bankruptcy
situations in which this issue may arise creates further complexities. For
example, in certain cases-single asset, single creditor-enforcement of the
waiver would appear to be appropriate. Indeed, as we discuss later, waivers in
this context do nothing more than "privatize" the bankruptcy proceeding or the
common pool problem. 29 However, in cases where there are multiple creditors,
such enforcement could seriously disadvantage the debtor and other creditors
and frustrate the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code.
Section I of this article reviews the historical notions of the automatic
stay prior to and under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "Act") as well as the
legislative history of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (the "Code").
Section II focuses on the arguments for and against upholding the validity of
agreements which waive the protections of the automatic stay. Specifically, this
section analyzes recent court decisions in this area and attempts to discern
differences between permissible and impermissible waivers. Section III reviews
the enforcability of other prepetition agreements. In Section IV, we introduce
our hypothesis, based fundamentally on economic principles, that
notwithstanding recent judicial decisions to the contrary, debtors should be
permitted to waive their rights to an automatic stay where such a waiver
effectuates a privatization between one debtor and one creditor of the common
pool problem. Returning to more practical issues, Section V concludes by
discussing concerns regarding waivers and by advising parties on how best to
proceed when drafting such provisions.

I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The first English statutes on bankruptcy gave the creditors of an
individual, at that time usually a merchant, various rights as a group that they
did not enjoy as individual creditors. An Act Against Such Persons as do Make
26. Mark Albright, Bankruptcy Judge Okays Hilton Plan, ST. PETERSBERG TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1994, at 1E; Phyllis Furman, Fight Looms over Growing Macy's Spoils, CRAIN'S
N.Y. Bus., Mar. 21, 1994, at 1; Matt Roush, Tower Bus' Trip through Chapter11 Ends Well,
CRAIN'S DET. BUS., Jan. 24, 1994, at 9.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
28. In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 482 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
29. See infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
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Bankrupt, 30 enacted in 1542, provided that any grieved party could bring an
action against the debtor if the debtor committed various acts hindering
creditors' attempts to collect their debts. These acts included "keeping house" or
flight "to parts unknown." 3' The act of keeping house was the practice of
isolating one's self at home, protected by the "English maxim that a man's
house is his castle," thus rendering one's self "immune to forcible intrusion by
legal process." 32 The bankruptcy statutes gave the Lord Chancellor authority,
upon the request of creditors, to gather the debtor's assets together and
distribute them "to every of the said creditors a portion, rate and rate alike,
according to the quantity of their debts." 33
These early English statutes provide the historical backdrop for the
sequestration of a debtor's assets and the restraints placed on creditor's attempts
to collect the debts owed to them. One stark difference between early English
bankruptcy and the modem form is that in 16th century England, debtors did
not receive a discharge of their debts after their assets were distributed among
their creditors. If debts were not fully satisfied after the distribution of the
assets, creditors had every remedy they had "before the making of this act." 34
The concept of bankruptcy took root in the United States during colonial
times. During the Continental Congress in Philadelphia in 1787, Charles
Pickney of South Carolina motioned that congressional power extend "to
establish uniform laws upon the subject of bankruptcies" under Article I of the
Constitution. Congress debated the motion sparingly and the bankruptcy clause
was quickly adopted as part of the Constitution. 35
After a financial crisis in the 1790s led to large business failures,
Congress exercised its bankruptcy power for the first time in 1800 by passing a
five year interim statute which was repealed in only three years. 36 Congress
passed and repealed several bankruptcy bills between 1800 and 1874. When the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867 was repealed in 1878, commercial organizations called
for a new bill.37 In 1882, Kansas Senator John Ingalls introduced the
predecessor to the modem automatic stay provision in a bill entitled Equity
Bankruptcy. 38 His amendment to that bill stated that "[t]he court may, at any
time during the proceedings, order that all or any other proceedings be stayed
30.

Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy, 52

L. REV. 189, 190 (1938) (citing 34, 35 Henry VIII ch. 4 (1542)).
3 1. Id. at 194. It was a regular custom in continental Europe for debtors to flee from
creditors. Flight was very much a product of the harsh treatment by medieval laws of insolvent
HARv.

debtors. Id. at 193.

32. Id. at 194. The notion of a man's home being his castle was quite evident in these
statutes. The English common law, unlike the laws in the rest of Europe at that time, provided
that creditors could not enter a debtor's home to collect a debt. As a result, the practice of
"keeping house" or cloistering one's self in one's house became a problem for Parliament to
address. This practice owed its existence to the "sanctity with which the common law had
invested in the Englishman's home." Israel Treiman, Escaping the Creditorin the Middle Ages,

43 L.Q. REV. 230, 233 (1927). Interestingly, although the practice of keeping house became
punishable, creditors were still not able to enter the house of a debtor to collect a debt as was the
case in France, Spain and Italy at the time this statute was passed. See Treiman, supranote 30,
at 194.
33. Treiman, supra note 30, at 195 n.21 (citing 34, 35 Henry VII ch.4 (1542)).
34.

Id.

35.

CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 4-5

36.
37.
38.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 152.

(1935).
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or dismissed." 39 He explained that the purpose of his amendment was to
preserve the entire estate of the bankrupt business for the creditors and
customers who have an interest in keeping the business afloat. 4o Senator Ingalls
recognized that a short forbearance would sometimes be all a debtor needed to
get financially healthy again, and he sought to change what he saw as
potential for destruction into a potential for preservation and
bankruptcy's
41
assistance.
Senator Ingalls' reform attempts, however, were not immediately
successful--Congress rejected a new bankruptcy bill almost annually until 1890
when the Torrey Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives and
passed after only two days of debate. 42 Although it was not passed by the
Senate, it was modified and reintroduced several more times. It was passed
again by the House in 1896 and by the Senate in 1897. 43 President McKinley
signed the Bankruptcy Act in 1898. 44 The Act retained the English notion of a
debtor committing "acts of bankruptcy," but modernized it by eliminating,
among other things, provisions for punishing the practices of keeping house and
flight to parts unknown. 45 The Act not only provided creditors with an
effective means for gathering and selling the46assets of a debtor, but also
provided debtors with a discharge for past debts.
At the same time that Congress was debating national bankruptcy laws,
states were enacting various stay-laws which prolonged the period when
debtors' property would be exempt from execution of foreclosure. Although
impairment of contract,47
the Supreme Court held these laws to be invalid as
48
legislators nevertheless continued to pass stay-laws.
The Act was amended several times during its life, most notably in 1938
with the passage of the Chandler Act. 49 One important intent of the Chandler
Act was to provide businesses with bankruptcy protection while they were in
the process of getting their financial houses in order.50 A significant aspect of
the Chandler Act was thus an automatic stay provision which allowed a debtor
time to reorganize her business. The law provided the bankruptcy court with
wide ranging powers to oversee and protect the estate of the debtor.5 '
Specifically, the Chandler Act provided for the staying of creditors' claims
brought against the debtor: "[a] suit which is founded upon a claim from which
39. Id. at 152-53.
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id.
42. Id.at 123-34.
43. Id. at 134-42.
44. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Bankruptcy Act of 1933
(Bankruptcy Act), ch.204, 47 Stat. 1467, repealed by Bankruptcy Code.
45. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 546 (1898).
46. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by Bankruptcy Act of 1933
(Bankruptcy Act), ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467, repealed by Bankruptcy Code.
47. WARREN, supra note 35, at 150.
48. Id. at 150-51.
49. Bankruptcy Amendments (Chandler) Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938), repealedby
Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
50. Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter11 Reorganizations:Reducing Costs,
Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REV. 581, 587-88 (1993).
51. Section 2(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 gives courts authority to "allow claims,
disallow claims, reconsider allowed or disallowed claims, and allow and disallow them against
the bankruptcy estate."

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

a discharge would be a release, and which is pending against a person at the
time of the filing of a petition by or against him, shall be stayed until an
adjudication or the dismissal of the petition....-52
In 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws to
study the Act and recommend possible changes to it.53 Three years later, the
Commission reported their findings to Congress and submitted a bill with their
recommendations. 54 These findings were disputed by the National Conference
of Bankruptcy Judges, which proposed an alternative bill. In time, both bills
were introduced into Congress. 55 Ultimately, after both bills were reviewed in
the course of extensive hearings and testimony, the Bankruptcy Code was
enacted in 1978 with § 362 providing:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under
section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
[15 U.S.C.A. § 78eee(a)(3)] operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities... 56

The legislative history of the Code indicates that the drafters recognized
the impact that the automatic stay has upon creditors, as well as the inadequacy
of the stay provisions to provide creditors relief when collateral deteriorates in
value. The Senate Report stated that the automatic stay "seriously affects the
rights of all of the debtor's creditors," 57 and as a result, certain limitations,
such as the requirement for adequate protection of the creditor's collateral,
were placed on the continuance of the stay.58 Protection in other forms was also
extended to creditors. For example, if a creditor petitions
the court for relief
59
from the stay, she is given calendar priority by the court.
The legislative history elaborates upon the protection the automatic stay
provides creditors. The House Report refers to the "common pool" problem
which the automatic stay is designed to prevent. 60 The premise of the common
pool problem is that the interests of an individual frequently run counter to the
interests of the group as a whole. In bankruptcy terms, this means that the
52.

Bankruptcy Amendments (Chandler) Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 849 (1938),

repealedby Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (enacting Title XI).
53. See DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 2-7 (1971).
54. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. NO. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973).
55. They were introduced as H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and H.R.
16643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
57. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5790.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 362(f).

59. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 57, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5790-91.
11 U.S.C. § 362(e) provides that the court must rule on a creditor's petition for relief from the

stay within 30 days. Otherwise, the stay terminates automatically.
60. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-42 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5786, 5835,
states that the automatic stay
provides creditors protection. Without [the stay], certain creditors would be able
to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property. Those who acted first
would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other
creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure
under which all creditors are treated equally.
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interests of a single creditor in collecting her debt often conflict with the

interests of a group of creditors.
The common pool is nicely illustrated with the image of a lake filled with
fish.61 If each individual is free to fish as much as they want, each would try to
catch as many fish as possible. Even if these individuals would realize the

benefits of catch limits, they might also realize that unilaterally limiting their
own fishing would not necessarily ensure a good supply of fish. To the
contrary, each person might believe that her restraint would benefit the others
and only harm herself while the supply of fish continued to dwindle. Each
person's interest would dictate that she catch as many fish as she could; this, of
course, contradicts the interest the group has in the continuing availability of
the fish. In short, without a device for restraining the group, an individual has a
disincentive to practice self-restraint. We will return to the notion of the
common pool again in Section IV of this article.

II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF WAIVERS OF THE
AUTOMATIC STAY
The legislative history of the stay provision states that § 362 "stops all
collection efforts...and all foreclosure actions." 62 Yet Congress included several
exceptions to the automatic stay provision. 63 Nothing in the legislative history
of the Code, however, addresses the concept of a debtor being able to

voluntarily waive the protection granted by Congress.
In discussing the enforceability of waivers of the automatic stay under the
Code, some courts have emphasized the lack of explicit recognition of waivers
under the Code as opposed to the Act. 64 Courts have suggested that this change
is a signal that Congress intended to prohibit debtors from waiving the
protection of the automatic stay. 65 Importantly, however, the waiver provisions
66
under the Act were limited to unsecured creditors and to dischargeable debts.
Other courts have denied the validity of waiver provisions, based on notions of
61. For an enlightening discussion of the common pool problem, see DOUGLAS BAIRD
& THOMAS JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY 31 (1985).
62. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 57, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840.
63. Among these express exclusions are those for criminal and regulatory actions. See 1
U.S.C. § 362(b).
64. Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d
446, 448 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Sky Group Int'l, 108 B.R. 86, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
65. Sky Group, 108 B.R. at 89.
66. While the Act did not contain a single automatic stay provision like § 362 of the
Code, it provided an amalgam of provisions with different staying effects upon various actions

against the debtor or property of the estate. Stays against certain actions were self-executing,

while stays against other actions required some affirmative action by the debtor or trustee. Frank
R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 177, 194-95 (1978).
This hodgepodge of protection is important for analyzing certain express authorizations to waive
the stay. For example, Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 401, under the Act, stated "the stay shall
continue until.. .the bankrupt is denied a discharge or waives or otherwise loses his right
thereto." FED. R. BANKR. P. § 401 (1973). Thus, if a debtor wanted to waive her right to
discharge of a certain debt, pursuant to § 11 of the Act, she would also waive her right to stay

certain methods of enforcement and collection of that debt. Compare, however, Rule 601,

which stayed enforcement of liens and did not provide express authorization to waive the
automatic stay. Accordingly, unsecured creditors could get relief from the stay by waiver, while,
by negative implication, secured and lien creditors could not. See old Fed. R. Bankr. P. §§ 401,

601, 411 U.S. 989 (1973).
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congressional purpose. 67 As they have noted, one of the fundamental purposes

of the automatic stay is to protect creditors as well as debtors from a race to the
courthouse to carve up the debtors' estate.6 s
Most bankruptcy courts appear to agree that waivers are not selfexecuting-creditors must apply to the court for relief. Section 362(d)
empowers the bankruptcy court to grant a stay of relief to a "party in interest"
if "cause" exists to do so, after notice and a hearing. 69 The Code does not define
"cause" and leaves that determination to the courts. Thus, the question facing
courts is whether a waiver constitutes "cause" to lift the stay. In answering that
question courts have generally examined the policies underlying the Code.
Courts which have upheld the validity of waivers generally do so under
one of two theories. The first is that a prepetition agreement of the debtor to
waive her protection under the automatic stay in the event she files for
bankruptcy constitutes "cause" to lift the stay under § 362(d)(1).70 Some courts
reason that since the debtor specifically agreed to the waiver, usually with the
advice of counsel, they are part of the basis of the creditor's bargain and the
debtor should be held to their part of the agreement. 71 The second theory used
by courts to uphold prepetition agreements waiving the stay is the bad faith
argument. 72 Courts have the authority to convert a Chapter 11 filing to a
Chapter 7 liquidation or to dismiss the bankruptcy petition outright if the court
finds that there is cause. 73 While the term "cause" as used in § 1212 is not
defined, it is well established that a Chapter 11 petition filed in bad faith
constitutes cause to dismiss the case. 74 If a court dismisses a case, the automatic
stay no longer protects the debtor's property from foreclosure or from
repossession by the creditors. In some cases, courts have stated that debtors who
have agreed to waive the protection of the stay, but then filed for bankruptcy
and sought protection under the stay, filed their petitions in bad faith with the
intent to hinder the collection efforts of their creditors.7 5
A discussion of some of the most recent cases addressing the validity of
these waivers will provide better insight into what courts find permissible and
impermissible. We will first examine those cases which have upheld waiver
agreements and then turn to those that have denied enforcement of waivers.

67. See, e.g., In re BNT Terminals, 125 B.R. 963, 973 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991)
(disallowing "exactly the type of transfer that the automatic stay is intended to prevent").

68.
69.

H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 24, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d).

70. See, e.g., In re Hudson Manor Partners, No. 91-81065HR, 1991 WL 472592
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1991) ("cause" existed under § 362(d)(1)).
71. In re Gulf Beach Dev. Corp., 48 B.R. 40 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re B.O.S.S.
Partners I, 37 B.R. 348 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1994).
72. See, e.g., In re Orange Park S. Partnership, 79 B.R. 79 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
73. Section 1112(b) of the Code provides, in relevant part, "[The court may convert a
case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title or may dismiss a case under this
chapter, whichever is in the best interest of creditors and the estate, for cause...." 11 U.S.C. §
1112(b) (1994).
74. In re Waldron, 785 F.2d 936 (1 lth Cir. 1986), cert. dismissedsub nom. Waldron v.

Shell Oil Co., 478 U.S. 1028 (1986); Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage
Corp., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Wamsganz, 54 B.R. 759 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985).
75.

Orange ParkS. Partnership,79 B.R. at 81, 82-83.
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A. Enforcement of Waivers
As bankruptcy courts gain more experience evaluating waivers, a clearer
framework for analysis is likely to develop. To date, however, courts have
articulated two policy considerations in support of waiver enforcement. First,
courts have given substantial weight to encouraging out-of-court workouts and
restructurings. The Code itself recognizes that bankruptcy may not always
prove to be the optimal solution.76 Second, some courts have also intimated that
market-wise, knowledgeable, commercial entities should be free to contract
away certain rights. Bankruptcy seriously modifies contractual arrangements,
however. Small modifications in the bankruptcy process may constitute a
significant infringement on a party's freedom to contract. Thus, courts
invariably distinguish waiver of the stay from waiver of the right to file
bankruptcy. As these courts have maintained, a debtor may waive a single right,
yet still avail itself of the multitude of other bankruptcy rights and receive a
"fresh start."
Courts have held that knowledgeable and commercial-wise parties who
freely enter into contracts should be held to those agreements in the absence of
a compelling reason making enforcement unreasonable. 77 "[Tihere is perhaps
no higher public policy.. .than to uphold contracts validly entered into and
legally permissible in subject matter .... Contracts entered into 'freely and
voluntarily' are to be held 'sacred', and courts 'are not lightly to interfere with
this freedom of contract."' 78 Because bankruptcy modifies contractual
arrangements, courts distinguish a waiver of the automatic stay from a waiver
of the right to file bankruptcy. 79 In In re Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc.,80 the
court held that a waiver of the right to file bankruptcy is void, even if it is a
bargained-for and knowledgeable one. The court relied on Fallick v. Kehr8 l
and Federal National Bank v. Koppe 82 in reaching its conclusion. Quoting
Koppel, the court stated, "[tihe bankruptcy act would.. .be nullified in the vast
majority of debts arising out of contacts, if [an advance waiver] were
permissible."8 3 The court also distinguished the Supreme Court's decision to
enforce a cognovit note in D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick,84 on the grounds that
it only concerned non-bankruptcy rights.85 Despite those decisions, it is notable
that a debtor may waive a single right yet still avail itself of the multitude of
other bankruptcy rights, such as the power to reject executory contracts and the
86
exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan for the first 120 days.
The problem, of course, is that in many cases, waiver of the automatic
stay has the same effect as waiving the right to file bankruptcy. Although courts
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1994).
77. See MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
78. See Parker Plaza W. Partners v. Unum Pension & Ins. Co., 941 F.2d 349, 352 (5th
Cir. 1991).
79. In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); Inre Hudson
Manor Partners, No. 91-81065HR, 1991 WL 472592, *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1991).
80. 12 B.R. 989 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980), vacated, 687 F.2d 344 (11th Cir. 1982).
81. 369 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1966).
82. 148 N.E. 379 (Mass. 1925).
83. 12 B.R. at 1009 (citing Koppel, 148 N.E. at 380).
84. 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (Court defined a cognovit note as a device whereby the debtor
consents in advance to the holder's obtaining judgment without notice or hearing.).
85. 12 B.R. at 1009.
86. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(c), 1121(b) (1994).
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have distinguished the two rights, a single asset debtor filing a bankruptcy
petition has little use for other bankruptcy protections. But this position can
lead to a slippery slope argument-if single rights may be waived, debtors may
begin waiving rights other than the automatic stay. This could conceivably
result in a flood of litigation. Presumably, courts would have to analyze each
different type of waiver to determine whether the debtor is, in effect, waiving
her right to file bankruptcy. While courts and creditors share the concern that a
debtor will contract to waive the automatic stay and then later challenge the
stipulation, courts have noted that waiver agreements may be a factor in
deciding whether or not there is a bad faith filing, but will not be considered a
bad faith filing per se. 87
In In re Gulf Beach Development Corp.,8 8 one of the first cases to

recognize the validity of a prepetition waiver, the court lifted the stay because
the court found it inequitable to allow a debtor to prevent the running of the
contractual condition while reaping the benefits of the release. The debtor had
executed a workout agreement whereby each party released the other from all
claims they may have, and the debtor agreed to the entry of a final judgment in
a pending foreclosure action. The debtor then filed bankruptcy and argued that
the foreclosure was stayed and the contractual agreement was invalid. The court
disagreed, concluding that the debtor had no equity in the property and could
not achieve a successful reorganization.8 9 Thus, the indirect waiver of the stay
appeared to be valid in bankruptcy, but the extent to which it necessitated lifting
the stay remained unclear.
Similarly, subsequent cases upheld the validity of indirect waivers of the
stay. 90 However, the enforcement was consistently within the context of a bad
faith filing. Because the courts aggregated the concepts of bad faith filing with
the validity of the waiver, the question of whether a waiver alone constituted
"cause" remained unclear.
In re B.O.S.S. Partners 191 began a string of cases decided in the

bankruptcy court of the Middle District of Florida which held that freedom of
contract prevailed over any prohibitions the Code may place on waivers of the
automatic stay. In this case, one of the creditors motioned for relief from the
stay. While the motion was pending, the debtor and creditor entered into a
stipulation which provided that the stay would be waived if the asset was not
sold by a specific date. The court began its discussion by reaffirming the
principle that "a stipulation freely entered into by the parties is binding on the
parties." 92 Despite the court's recognition of the flexibiliy of the rule and its
equitable powers under § 105 of the Code, it refused to modify the agreement.
The court upheld the validity of the stipulation adding that once the parties have

87. Lisa H. Fenning et al., Good Faith:A RoundtableDiscussion, 1 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 11, 39 (1993).
88.
89.
90.

48 B.R. 40 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).
Id. at43.
In re Growers Properties No. 56, Ltd., 117 B.R. 1015 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In

re International Supply Corp. of Tampa, 72 B.R. 510 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Orange
Park S. Partnership, 79 B.R. 79 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
91. 37 B.R. 348 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984).

92.

Id. at 350.
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waived the protection of § 362, the debtor must "establish
with persuasive
93
evidence that the extraordinary remedy is warranted."
In a second opinion written by Judge Paskay, the court in In re Orange
Park South Partnership,94 dismissed the case because the filing for bankruptcy
was in bad faith. The creditor had foreclosed on the sole asset of the debtor and
was about to sell the asset at a judicial sale when the debtor and creditor entered
into an agreement. The debtor agreed to the appointment of a receiver; it
acknowledged that there was no equity in the property; and it agreed that any
bankruptcy filing would be unfounded and was filed for the sole purpose of
delay. 95 The debtor failed to satisfy the debt and the creditor foreclosed on the
property and prepared to sell it. When the debtor filed for bankruptcy four
days prior to the sale, the creditor sued to enforce the debtor's waiver. The
court used its equitable power to dismiss the case and remove the protection of
the automatic stay. The court held that the debtor's lack of equity in the
property, the presence of few unsecured creditors, the lack of employees, and
the fact that the estate consisted of a single asset combined with the debtor's
waiver of its protection under the stay compelled the court to dismiss the filing
for bad faith. 96 With regard to the validity of the stipulation containing the
waiver provision, the court said "there is absolutely nothing in this record
which would warrant the conclusion that the stipulation was obtained either by
coercion, fraud or by mutual mistake of material facts which have97 been
traditionally recognized as the only valid bases to rescind an agreement."
In spite of its questionable reasoning, In re Citadel Properties,Inc.98 has

become the leading authority supporting the enforcement of prepetition waivers
of the right to an automatic stay. As part of a workout, the debtor in that case
agreed to waive the automatic stay in the event of bankruptcy in return for
forbearance from the lender in enforcing the previously obtained foreclosure
judgment against the debtor's sole asset. When the debtor subsequently filed for
relief under Chapter 11, the court enforced the waiver against the debtor.99 In
support of its holding, the court failed to offer any substantive analysis on this
point, but merely cited three cases from the Middle District of Florida
Bankruptcy Court, all decided by Chief Judge Paskay.100 Despite the fact that
none of these cases was apposite,10 the court held that the stipulation was
binding on the parties since the debtor did not waive its entire protection in
bankruptcy, just the protection afforded by § 362. The court also attempted to
clarify the waiver's status, at least to the extent that waivers were more than a
factor that could constitute "cause" standing alone. The court held that the
waiver was "binding upon the parties and that sufficient cause exist[ed] to lift

93.

Id. at 351.

96.

Id. at 81-82.

94.
95.

79 B.R. 79 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
Id. at82.

97.

Id. at 82.

98.

86 B.R. 275 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).

99.

Id. at 276.

100. In re International Supply Corp., 72 B.R. 510 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Gulf
Beach Dev., 48 B.R. 40 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re B.O.S.S. Partners I, 37 B.R. 348

(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984). Judge Paskay enforced the prepetition agreements granting creditors
the right to relief from the automatic stay.
101. See Bassin, supra note 18, at 9-11.
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the automatic stay."' 0 2 Moreover, the court offered an alternative holding that
"cause" existed to lift the stay because the debtor filed in bad faith. Thus,
according to this court, a waiver can constitute "cause" standing alone. 03
In one of the first cases to provide any substantial analysis of the waiver
issue, the court in In re Club Tower L.P. 104 granted a creditor's motion to lift

the automatic stay over the opposition of a Chapter 11 debtor because the court
found that the debtor had filed in bad faith-the debtor agreed to a provision in
a prepetition workout agreement which granted immediate relief from the stay
if it filed a bankruptcy petition.105 The court cited Citadeland Orange Parkfor
the proposition that prepetition waivers are generally enforceable in
bankruptcy.106 The court then went on to discuss the policies of encouraging
workouts and relinquishing only a "single bankruptcy right." 0 7 Based on these
reasons, the court held that the waiver constituted "cause."' 08 However, as in
Citadel, the court made an alternative holding that the debtor filed in bad faith
and such action also constituted "cause." 109
The court went on to differentiate the enforcement of a waiver of the
automatic stay from enforcement of a waiver of the right to file, implying that
the latter violates public policy.10 The court maintained that the debtor had
waived only a single protection of the Code, rather than all of the rights and
benefits provided by the Code."' The court reasoned that the debtor had
already received the benefit of the automatic stay during the pendency of the
lift-stay motion and nothing in the Bankruptcy Code guaranteed that the stay
would remain in effect throughout the case.112 As a final point, the court held
that enforcing workout agreements furthered the legitimate public policy of
encouraging out-of-court restructuring and settlements." 3
4 the Georgia
On facts similar to In re Citadel Properties,"1
Bankruptcy
Court found, in In re Hudson Manor Partners, Ltd.,15 that there was no

violation in enforcing the waiver because the debtor still had all the rights
afforded by the Code. This was the first unadulterated holding that a waiver
was enforceable standing alone without an alternative finding of proof of bad
faith. While the court noted that a prohibition against filing for bankruptcy
would be against public policy, the court found that a debtor cannot avail
herself of protection under § 362 in an attempt to avoid a previous contract
102. Citadel, 86 B.R. at 276.
103. Id.
104. 138 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
105. Id. at 310-11.
106. Id. at311.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 310.
110. Id. at311.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 312 (citations omitted).
114. The debtor defaults on the loan payments, the creditor forecloses, the parties stipulate
to a forbearance agreement in exchange for the debtor's waiving the protection of the automatic
stay in the event of bankruptcy, the debtor cannot rehabilitate itself and defaults a second time,
the creditor forecloses again and prepares to sell the property at a judicial sale and, at the last
possible minute, the debtor files for bankruptcy and seeks protection under § 362. See supra
notes 98-103 and accompanying text.

115.

No. 91-81065HR, 1991 WL 472592 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1991).
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made with a lender. Relying on Citadel, the court found that the waiver
constituted a "cause" to lift the stay. While the court did not limit its decision to
its facts, the court did state that "[i]n situations such as this, i.e., a dispute
between essentially two parties over a single real estate asset, workouts should
'

16

be encouraged." "

A recent bankruptcy court decision in South Carolina, In re Cheeks,117
adds further authority to this line of cases. In Cheeks, a Chapter 13 debtor who
had waived her right to contest the lender's lift-stay motion six months prior to
filing did, in fact, oppose it. The court enforced the agreement and lifted the
stay.118 The public policy in favor of encouraging out-of-court settlements was
listed by the court as the most compelling reason for enforcement of the
waiver. As the court found, the debtor had received relief under the
forbearance agreement approximating that which would have been available in
a bankruptcy proceeding. Accordingly, the court held that to allow the debtor
to receive the full benefits resulting from reimposition of the automatic stay
would be inconsistent with the court's "oft-stated skepticism regarding serial
bankruptcy filings."119 As in Club Tower, the court noted that the debtor had
elected to forego only a single benefit of the Bankruptcy Code in exchange for
the creditor's forbearance. 20 Finally, the court stated that a waiver "do[es] not
oust th[e] Court's Jurisdiction to hear objections to stay relief filed by other
parties in interest"; it simply means that no weight will be given to the debtor's
objections.121
One of the most difficult issues involving waiver enforceability arises in
the serial filing cases. Occasionally, a bankruptcy court order or a stipulation
approved by a bankruptcy judge will contain a provision which provides for
relief from the stay in the first case and even purports to provide for relief
from the stay in a later case. In several cases, the prior relief from stay order
has been enforced using a res judicata analysis, although it is difficult to
substantiate this reasoning in a later case in which the facts are necessarily at
least somewhat different.
In perhaps the leading case in this area, the court in In re
Franklin,122 in the third of five serial filings, upheld an order entered by the
bankruptcy court in the second bankruptcy case granting prospective relief
from the automatic stay in future bankruptcy proceedings pursuant to a
stipulation of the parties. The secured creditor had concluded a foreclosure sale
three days after the third bankruptcy petition was filed. The debtor attempted to
116.

Id. at *2. The most recent case on this issue involved a hybrid waiver. In In re

Wheaton Oaks Office Partners, No. 92 C 3955, 1992 WL 381047 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Dec. 10,
1992), the court held that a plan of reorganization in a separate bankruptcy proceeding which
permitted foreclosure proceedings in the event of default constituted "cause" in the instant
bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, the plan was post-petition in the first proceeding, but prepetition
in the second. Nevertheless, the court relied on Citadeland Club Tower in its decision. Id. at *1.
Another interesting waiver issue arose in Smith v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 10 (1991). In
this instance the bankruptcy court approved a post-petition waiver of discharge for tax liabilities
of the debtor. The tax court held that by waiving discharge the tax court proceedings were not
stayed. Id. at 16-17.
117. 167 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994)
118. Id. at 820.
119. Id. at819.
120. Id. at 818-19.
121. Id. at 819.
122. In re Franklin, 802 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1986).
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set aside the foreclosure sale, arguing that the sale was prohibited by the
automatic stay invoked by the third bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court,
upholding the order entered in the second case, held that the third petition did
not impose the automatic stay and that the sale was valid. The debtor appealed
on the grounds that the bankruptcy judge in the second case had no jurisdiction
to lift the stay in future filings by means of a stipulated agreement or order.
The district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals both affirmed the
bankruptcy court's decision holding that the previous bankruptcy court had
removed the
jurisdiction to approve the stipulation and that the stipulation1 23
property from any automatic stay imposed through future filings.
The Ninth Circuit reached the same result in In re Springpark
Associates.1 24 Here, the debtors filed a Chapter 12 petition in which they
executed a stipulation regarding refinancing of certain debts. The stipulation
included provisions that the automatic stay was terminated and established a
waiting period before which a foreclosure date could be set and advertised. The
debtors' Chapter 12 case was voluntarily dismissed, but the refinancing never
materialized and the debtors filed a second Chapter 12 petition, seeking to
invoke the automatic stay. The creditor, a party to the stipulation approved in
the first Chapter 12 case, sought relief from the automatic stay. The
bankruptcy court held that the parties were bound by the stipulation approved
in the previous bankruptcy case, stating that "irreparable harm" would be
caused to creditors and to the judicial process if the stipulation was not
enforced. 125
In a similar decision, the court for the Central District of California in In
re Abdul-Hasan,126 enforced the provisions in an order for relief from stay
granted in a prior Chapter 13 case and ruled that the prospective relief set
forth in the prior order remained in effect in the subsequent bankruptcy case.
The court further held that prospective relief granted in the prior Chapter 13
removed any requirement that the creditor seek relief from the automatic stay
in any subsequent filing.1 27 The court based its decision on the principles of
collateral estoppel and res judicata. As the court noted, the debtor was
collaterally estopped from attacking the previous order granting prospective
relief. Further, even if collateral estoppel did not prevent the debtor's attack,
res judicata did. The prior order was binding in a subsequent action involving
the same parties and the same issues.1 28 The court rejected the debtor's
argument that the issues presented were different because there had been a
"change in circumstances," noting that if there had been a true change in
circumstances at the time of the subsequent filing, the debtor could have sought
a temporary restraining order and injunction under § 105 of the Code to
extend the automatic stay to the secured creditor. The court also noted that
while it would have been "more comfortable" if the original order had a six to
twelve month time limit, the fact that eighteen months had passed between the
entry of the original order and the filing of the subsequent case did not present
123.

Id. at 326.

124. 623 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Springpark Assoc. v. Crown
Life Ins. Co., 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
125. Id. at 1381.
126. 104 B.R. 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
127. Id. at 266.
128. Id. at 266-67.

1996]

PREPETITION WAIVERS

a challenge to an estoppel or laches position that would prevent enforcement of
29
the order.1
B. Denial of Waivers
As the cases above demonstrate, it is unclear whether a waiver is merely
a factor to consider in determining whether "cause" exists or whether it is
strictly enforceable. An obvious and important factor is the context under
which the waiver is executed. The leading cases have so far involved one large
secured creditor and a few small unsecured creditors. However, if unsecured
creditors could utilize waivers, bankruptcy would not prevent them from
obtaining a judgment lien and levying on the debtor's property or simply
allowing their claim to survive resolution of the case. These unsecured
creditors could thereby gain priority over other unsecured creditors, and avoid
dischargeability provisions. Undersecured creditors could apparently achieve
the same result with respect to the unsecured portion of their claim. Indeed,
undersecured creditors have a stronger argument for lifting of the stay because
they have more to lose than fully or oversecured creditors. Oversecured
creditors may receive adequate protection for the depreciation of the property
and interest on their claim while undersecured creditors do not.130
Certainly, debtors and other creditors could argue that enforcement of a
waiver would produce an inequitable result if the secured creditor was allowed
to foreclose on property that was necessary to a feasible reorganization. In such
cases, the Code's policies of a "fresh start" and creditor protection would seem
to overshadow the policy of encouraging out-of-bankruptcy workouts.
Moreover, if a debtor's business has a "going concern" value greater than the
value of its individual parts, a policy which assures the most value for the
property of the estate should come into play. Finally, as Peter Partee has
observed, the enforceability of waivers may also depend upon the jurisdiction's
law concerning standing to invoke protection of the automatic stay.' 3 ' In those
jurisdictions where creditors have standing, they may be able to prevent a
debtor from waiving the stay because the debtor would be unable to contract
away the rights of creditors not party to the agreement. In other jurisdictions,
debtors would be able to waive the stay.
One thing seems clear: even when a waiver agreement purports to be
self-executing, courts have unanimously held them not to be so. 132 The rationale
behind this rule should be readily apparent. The stay is intended to benefit not
only the debtor, by granting the debtor relief from the financial pressures that

129. Id.
130. See supranotes 26-27 and accompanying text.
131. Partee, supra note 14, at 7-8.
132. See In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994):
[The lender] did not take literally the language of the Agreement that its approval
"shall constitute relief.. .from the automatic stay pursuant to section 362" but
instead sought to obtain that relief from the Court. It is well that it did so, for I
agree with Judge Markovitz that "the contention that this waiver is enforceable
and self-executing is without merit." A motion for relief under § 362 is required
for enforcement.
Id. at 483 (citation omitted).
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led to bankruptcy, 133 but also the creditors as a group.1 34 By protecting
creditors through limitations on an individual creditor's rights to pursue its
own remedies against the debtor's property-an orderly liquidation is ensured
in which all creditors are treated equally.1 35 A creditor that acts 1against
the
36
debtor without moving to lift the stay may be penalized by the court.
In one of the leading cases on self-execution, In re Sky Group
International,137 the lender and debtor signed an Assumption Agreement
pursuant to the acquisition of a hotel. The Agreement, which served as the
financing instrument, provided that if the debtor filed for bankruptcy or an
involuntary petition was filed against it, it "consent[ed] to relief from the
automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 to allow [the creditor] to exercise
its rights and remedies hereunder with respect to the Debtor's property."1 38
The debtor filed bankruptcy and the lender argued that not only was the waiver
enforceable but that it was self-executing, without any other action by the
debtor, creditors, or court.
The court held that the agreement was not self-executing and the
creditor would still have to petition the court for relief. The court decided that
the term "automatic" was operative here and meant that the stay is imposed
without action by the debtor or the creditors. 39 Moreover, the court looked to
the legislative history and determined that Congress intended the stay to not
only protect debtors, but creditors as well. Without the stay, creditors would
race to the courthouse to carve up the debtor's estate. The court found that:
lt]o grant a creditor relief from stay simply because the debtor elected to
waive the protection afforded the debtor by the automatic stay ignores
the fact that it also is designed to protect all creditors and to treat them
all equally. The orderly liquidation procedure contemplated by the Code
would be placed in jeopardy, especially where (as here) none of the
creditors who brought the involuntary petition was a party to the
Agreement in which
the debtor allegedly waived its right to the
40
automatic stay.1
Likewise, in Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix
Hotel Corp.,141 filed just a short time after the Code was enacted, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that an appeal of a lawsuit which involved
133. In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 89 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5787,

5963, 6296-97).
134. See In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994):
[Tihe automatic stay comes about by operation of law and subsequently becomes
lifted or modified only after a motion which is duly filed and served is heard. The
bankruptcy code requires these steps and this procedure because creditors have a
right under the Code to require that assets be marshalled in an orderly and
equitable fashion.
Id. at 819. See also Sky Group, 108 B.R. at 88. ('The legislative history makes it clear that the
automatic stay has a dual purpose of protecting the debtor and all creditors alike.").
135. Sky Group, 108 B.R. at 88; see also Farm Credit v. Polk, 160 B.R. 870, 873
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (citing Association of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix
Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 1982)).
136. See 11 U.S.C § 362(h); In re Goodman, 991 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1993).
137. 108 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).
138. Id. at 88.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 682 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1982).
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damages to be paid out of the debtor's estate would automatically be stayed
because of § 362.142 In this case the hotel had filed for Chapter 11 protection
during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment which had awarded damages
on a counterclaim. The court noted the distinction between the Act, where
1 43
debtors could waive the stay, and the Code, where the stay was automatic.
The court, again looking to the purpose Congress had in enacting § 362, said
that the appeal of the debtor in the action did not act as a waiver of the
automatic stay. The court discussed the broad scope of the stay and held that
even if the debtor filed its petition before appealing the lower court decision, it
did not waive the protection of the stay. 44
In a case analogous to St. Croix, the Second Circuit in Ostano
Commerzanstalt v. Telewide System' 45 recognized that even if a debtor agrees
to waive the protection of the stay pursuant to a petition filed during an appeal,
the waiver is still invalid. Here, the debtor had agreed that the stay did not have
any effect on the appeal in process. The court invalidated the waiver using the
same reasoning as the Third Circuit in St. Croix and held that the protection is
"automatic and mandatory with the filing of the petition."146
47
In another leading decision in this area, the court in In re Powers1
acknowledged the prevalence of waivers in workout agreements, and while
essentially following the reasoning in Cheeks, it significantly narrowed its
holding. In Powers, the court held that a Chapter 11 debtor's prepetition waiver
of the automatic stay was a "primary element" to be considered in determining
if cause exists for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).148 Finding
a duly-executed prepetition waiver, the court placed the burden upon the debtor
to show that the court should not enforce it. However, unlike Cheeks, the
debtor was not precluded from contesting the motion. The court ultimately
declined to lift the stay without an evidentiary hearing to consider additional
49
factors.
As framed, the facts in Powers offered little assistance to the debtor's
cause. While in Chapter 11 for the first time, the debtor executed a workout
agreement with mortgagee bank ("Haymarket") and then voluntarily dismissed
the case. 50 The agreement included a provision allowing Haymarket to assert
against the debtor its rights as mortgagee without seeking relief under the
automatic stay. Two years later the debtor defaulted on the workout agreement,
Haymarket began foreclosure proceedings, and the debtor filed a second
Chapter 11 petition. Haymarket immediately sought relief from the stay, and
the parties agreed to allow the court to first determine the efficacy of the
15 1
waiver.
The bankruptcy judge, Judge Hillman, stated that he would consider
"extraordinary matters," such as radical and new developments which

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 449.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 449.
790 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id.
170 B.R. 480 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id. at 482.
Id. at481.
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drastically changed the economic picture and value of the collateral, along with
four other factors. The other four factors the court considered included: (1) the
benefit which the debtor received from the workout agreement as a whole; (2)
the extent to which the creditor waived rights or would be otherwise prejudiced
if the waiver was not enforced; (3) the effect of enforcement on other
creditors; and (4) whether there appeared to be a likelihood of a successful
reorganization. 152 The court's final decision in Powers has not been reported,
but on these facts, the debtor would clearly have had a difficult time rebutting
the waiver, considering the serial filing.
Taking a different approach, the court in Farm Credit of Central
53 considered both competing lines of authority, Citadel
Florida1
and Sky
Group, and chose to differentiate the case from the Citadel line based on the
facts of the case before it. The court analyzed the Citadel line of cases and
found that in each case the bankruptcy court, expressly or impliedly,
determined that the debtor could not effectively reorganize. 154 Additionally, the
Farm Credit court noted that, of the courts that have enforced prepetition
waivers, many have done so in single asset cases where indicia of debtor bad
faith were present. 155 In Farm Credit,the debtor's business operations included
ranching, management of substantial commercial and investment properties,
and a major heavy machinery repair business, which together employed a
number of people, generated substantial income, and involved the types of
activity for which Chapter 11 was designed. 156
Ultimately, the Farm Credit court found itself in agreement with the
underlying rationale of Sky Group-the stay is intended to protect all creditors
and to prevent the dissipation or diminution of the debtor's assets while
rehabilitative efforts are undertaken. 57 The court adopted the position that
prepetition agreements providing for the lifting of the stay are "not per se
binding on the debtor, as a public policy position."158 The court found support
for its position in the policies behind the Code which it said were consistent
with the purposes of the automatic stay: to protect the debtor's assets, to
provide temporary relief from creditors, and to promote equality of
distribution among the creditors by forestalling a race to the courthouse. 159
The final significant case in this area, In re Jenkins Court Associates

Limited Partnership,60 concluded that enforcing a prepetition waiver of the
automatic stay "too closely approximates the more reviled prohibition against
filing for bankruptcy protection."1 6 1 In Jenkins, the debtor obtained a
construction loan in excess of $17 million in 1989, granting the lender a
mortgage and other rights as security. In 1992, the terms of the transaction
were renegotiated and the debtor signed a waiver providing that if it sought
bankruptcy protection: (1) the lender was entitled to immediate relief from the
152.

Id.
160 B.R. 870 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 872.
Id. at 873.

153.

158.

Id.
Id. (citing In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987)).
Id. at 873.

159. Id. (citing GATX Aircraft Corp. v. M/V Courtney Leigh, 768 F.2d 711, 716 (5th
Cir. 1985)).
160. 181 B.R. 33 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).

161.

Id. at 37.
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stay; (2) the debtor had no equity in the project; (3) no chance of a successful
reorganization existed; and (4) the debtor's filing was deemed to be commenced
in bad faith per se if the debtor rejected or failed to honor the foregoing
agreements. 162 Sometime after September 30, 1994, the original lender, Fleet
National Bank, assigned its rights under the loan agreement to Jenkins Court
Pennsylvania Limited Partnership. 163 The debtor failed to locate permanent
financing and ultimately filed a Chapter 11 petition on November 23, 1994.164
On March 6, 1995, the court heard the secured creditor's motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for relief from the automatic stay. As in Powers,
the parties agreed that in lieu of an evidentiary hearing, the court should first
determine whether the waiver of the automatic stay granted by the debtor to the
secured creditor pursuant to the prepetition renegotiated agreement should be
enforced. 65 In its opinion, the Jenkins court expressed that it was "somewhat
perplexed" as to why the secured creditor agreed to bifurcate the issues and rest
on the limited record. 166
The court refused to enforce the waiver of the automatic stay and denied
the creditor's motions.167 In reaching this result the court considered the public
policies at stake, rather than merely relying on prior case law. Despite the
court's acknowledgement that the most compelling reason for enforcing
prepetition waivers was the public policy encouraging out-of-court
restructuring and settlements, 68 the court determined that it must, as a court of
equity, balance the moving party's right to rely on the terms of a bargained-for
prepetition settlement agreement against the congressionally expressed public
policy underpinning the Bankruptcy Code. 169
The court supported its holding by relying on several policy arguments.
First, the court pointed to the long standing prohibition on consensual restraints
against filing for bankruptcy. Although the court distinguished a waiver of the
protection of the automatic stay from a blanket prohibition against filing, it
recognized that in this context it may be "a distinction without a meaningful
difference."' 170 Second, the court expressed the public policy in favor of
allowing debtors a breathing spell from creditors so that reorganization can be
attempted.' 7 ' The court stated that the instant case was a paradigmatic example
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.

165. Id. See also In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 481 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
166. 181 B.R. at 36: "[The secured creditor's] exclusive reliance on the admissions in [the
renegotiated agreement] as proof that (1) the [d]ebtor has no equity in the [piroject and has no
chance of a successful reorganization, and (2) that the [d]ebtor commenced this bankruptcy case
in bad faith, is ill-founded." Id.
167. Id. at 37.
168. Id. at 36 (citing In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817, 819 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994)).
169. Id. (citing In re Tobago Bay Trading Co., 112 B.R. 463 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990)).
170. Id.Referring to the -language from Citadel that distinguished the enforcement of a
waiver granting a lender relief from stay from the enforcement of a waiver of a debtor's right to

file for bankruptcy, the Jenkins court held,
[tihis Court disagrees with that proposition as to the matter sub judice. As a
practical matter, there may be little significant distinction between the enforcement

of a pre-petition waiver of the automatic stay in a single asset case and the

Id.

enforcement of a provision prohibiting the filing of a bankruptcy case in the first
place.
171.

Id. at 37.
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of a single asset case: the debtor owned the property subject to a single secured
claim. The debtor had very few other creditors, a limited number of
employees, and its purpose was essentially limited to operation of the
improvements that had been made to the property. 172 The court held that, in
single asset cases particularly, the public policy behind the automatic stay
which favors encouragement of out-offrequently outweighs the public policy
17 3
court restructuring and settlements.
In reaching its decision, the court also focused on the tremendous impact
that a prepetition waiver of the automatic stay can have on a case. 174 As the
court noted, here, as in many single asset cases, enforcement of the waiver
would remove the asset from the bankruptcy estate and instead pass it into
foreclosure proceedings, thereby eliminating any possibility to formulate a
repayment plan.1 75
The Jenkins court in the end placed the waivers on the same footing as
did the court in Powers, where the waiver was considered a "primary element"
76
in ordering relief. 1
[T]hat is not to say that [the secured creditor] will not receive any
benefit from the waiver. The follow-up hearing will not proceed on a
blank slate. On the contrary, the Court will consider the representations
in the Prepetition settlement agreement against whatever additional
evidence might be forthcoming
at the subsequent evidentiary hearing as
a significant factor. 177
Importantly, in many cases the acts of a creditor are considered by law
never to have happened if violative of the letter or spirit of the Bankruptcy
Code. The general rule is that any act or occurrence that violates the automatic
stay is void ab initio.178 Terms in contracts triggered by179a bankruptcy filing
(so-called ipso facto clauses) also are generally held void.
The court's holding in Sky Group could be interpreted as placing waivers
of the automatic stay in this category. In that case, the court gave no weight to
the waiver when deciding whether to lift the stay. 180 But the Sky Group court
did not hold that all such waivers are void; it merely refused to lift the stay on
account of the waiver. Further, the court expressed concern regarding the
rights of non-moving creditors which have now been effectively addressed by
both the Citadel and Powers line of cases. These lines of cases enforce the
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protection[s] provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives a debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor
to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan or simply to be relieved of the
financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 24, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5787, 5963, 6296-97.
172. In re Jenkins, 181 B.R. at 37.
173. Id.
174. Id.

175.

Id.

180.

In re Sky Group Int'l, Inc., 108 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989).

176. See In re Powers, 170 B.R. 480, 484 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) ("My view is that the
waiver is a primary element to be considered in determining if cause exists for relief from the
automatic stay under § 362(d)(1). However, the existence of the waiver does not preclude third
parties, or the debtor from contesting the motion.").
177. 181 B.R. at 37.
178. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 3-32, at 155 (1993).
179. See Jenkins, 181 B.R. at 36.
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debtor, by allowing non-moving creditors an
waiver only against the
18
opportunity to be heard. '
At least one commentator has suggested that a debtor's waiver of the
automatic stay should be considered void as against public policy.182 William
Bassin, whose article predates the Cheeks, Powers, and Jenkins decisions, makes
several arguments to support this position. First, he argues that even if a statute
prohibiting various activities does not explicitly prohibit enforcement of
contracts with respect to those activities, a court can weigh the public policies at
stake to determine whether unenforceability should be added to the sanctions
provided by the legislature. 183 Second, Bassin contends that the orderly
liquidation procedure contemplated by the Code would be placed in jeopardy if
parties are allowed to independently contract out of the stay, and this would
result in unpredictable outcomes at the hands of independent parties. 184 Finally,
Bassin maintains that previous cases that enforced the waiver were not well
reasoned, creating a "slippery slope" which would ultimately make the
Bankruptcy Code an optional device. 85 Bassin also suggests that the policy of
encouraging out-of-court restructuring is not promoted by enforcing
prepetition waivers of the automatic stay. 8 6 Though voiding automatic stay
waivers obtained in a workout agreement would be out of the current
mainstream of judicial thinking, the idea merits serious discussion if the public
policies supposedly served by enforcing the agreements in fact are not.
1I. ENFORCEABILITY OF OTHER PREPETITION
AGREEMENTS
Waivers of the right to automatic stay have rarely been considered in

isolation; typically a workout agreement includes other waivers and
stipulations. The most common additional waiver is a provision that any
bankruptcy filing by the debtor is deemed to have been commenced in "bad
faith." Another common waiver purports to exempt a particular debt from
discharge in bankruptcy. These waivers are often supported by a stipulation
listing numerous factors that would allow a court to reach the same conclusion.
A. "Bad Faith" Stipulation
Courts have been moved to dismiss a bankruptcy case because of a
provision in a workout agreement stating that any subsequent bankruptcy filing
is deemed to be commenced in bad faith. 87 Failing to file in good faith is
181. See In re Cheeks, 167 B.R. 817 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994); In re Club Tower L.P., 138
B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In re Hudson Manor Partners, No. 91-81065HR, 1991 WL
472592 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Dec. 31, 1991).
182. Bassin, supra note 18, at 10.
183. Id. at 1 (citing E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 5.1, 5.5, at 348, 371 (2d
ed. 1990)).
184. Id. at 1, 13 (citing Federal Nat'l Bank v. Koppel, 148 N.E. 379, 380 (Mass. 1925))
("[i]t would be vain to enact a bankruptcy law with all its elaborate machinery for settlement of
the estates of bankrupt debtors, which could so easily be rendered of no effect.").
185. Id. at 16.
186. Id. at 16-17.
187. Some of the reported decisions essentially apply the same analysis to prepetition
good faith agreements and waivers of the automatic stay. See In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R.
307 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In re Citadel Properties, 86 B.R 275 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988)
(both enforcing prepetition waivers after finding significant indicia of bad faith). In other cases
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widely accepted as adequate justification for dismissing a case.188 Courts take
into account the debtor's intent, as evidenced by the timing of the filing, and
numerous objective factors when determining whether a debtor has filed a
8
petition in good faith.1 9
In In re Jenkins, the court refused to dismiss the case, despite the debtor's
prepetition acknowledgment of lack of good faith.19o The Jenkins court
emphasized that the determination of whether a bankruptcy petition has been
filed in bad faith is fact intensive.191 Since the secured creditor offered only a
two year old prepetition settlement agreement into evidence, the court posited
that it was not unreasonable to wonder whether the debtor's circumstances or
market conditions may have changed since then, thereby "undercutting the
thrust of the earlier representations."1 92 Thus, the court held that none of the
indicia of bad faith had been proved to its satisfaction, and denied the secured
creditor's motion to dismiss. 193 This holding is particularly noteworthy because
Jenkins involved a typical single-asset real estate debtor. Despite the fact that
such cases inherently show multiple indicia of bad faith, the court decided
that
94
the public policy of offering debtors "breathing space" took precedence. 1
B. Prepetition Waiver of Right to Discharge

Under § 727(a)(10) of the Code, the debtor may waive discharge of a
debt if the waiver is executed in writing after the order for relief and then
approved by the court. 95 However, the Code contains no explicit prohibition
against prepetition waiver of the right to discharge. Notwithstanding this,
courts have typically held these waivers void as against public policy. 96 The
general rule is that all debts are dischargeable in bankruptcy unless specifically
excepted by the Code or other applicable federal law. 197 Section 523
enumerates the exceptions to discharge, and does not except from discharge
those debts which the debtor has agreed by contract shall not be discharged in
bankruptcy. 198
the prepetition good faith agreement is considered independently. See In re Jenkins, 181 B.R.
33 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Aurora Invs., 134 B.R. 982 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re

Orange Park S. Partnership, 79 B.R. 79 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
188. See Note, PrepetitionAgreements and the Implied Good FaithRequirement, 1 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 197 (1993).
189. See id. The factors include whether: (1) the debtor has only one asset; (2) the debtor
has few unsecured creditors whose claims are small in relation to those of the secured creditors;
(3) the debtor's one asset is the subject of a foreclosure action as a result of default on the debt;

(4) the debtor's financial condition is, in essence, a two party dispute between the debtor and

secured creditors which can be resolved in the pending state foreclosure action; (5) the debtor
has little or no cash flow; (6) the debtor can't meet current expenses, including the payment of
personal property and real estate taxes; and (7) the debtor has no employees. In re Phoenix
Piccadilly, 849 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (11th Cir. 1988).
190. In re Jenkins, 181 B.R. 33, 37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
191. Id. at 36.
192. Id. The court did allow that its result might be different if the prepetition agreement
were more proximate in time to the bankruptcy filing.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 37.
195. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10) (1994).
196. Bassin, supra note 18, at 15 n.115.
197. In re Levinson, 58 B.R. 831, 837 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1986), aff'd., 66 B.R. 548
(N.D. III. 1986), aff'd., 831 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1987).
198. 58 B.R. at 837.
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The leading case in this context is In re Levinson, 199 where the court
refused to give weight to a state court consent order in which the debtor had
agreed that his debt would not be discharged in a subsequent bankruptcy case.
The court focused on public policy considerations in holding that a debtor may
not contract away his or her right to a bankruptcy discharge. The court further
found that there was no effective waiver of discharge200under § 727(a)(10), or
effective reaffirmation of a single debt under § 524(c).
C. Stipulations of Fact as Opposed to Mere Waiver
In Klingman v. Levinson, 201 the court held that, for public policy
reasons, while the debtor may not contract away the right to a discharge in
bankruptcy, a debtor may stipulate to the underlying facts that the bankruptcy
court must examine to determine whether a debt is dischargeable. In Jenkins,
the court suggested that had the stipulation been made closer in time to the
order for relief, the factual admissions in the stipulation might be given greater
202
weight.
Stipulations pertaining to the character of the debtor's conduct, such as a
debtor admission that "any subsequent bankruptcy filing is for the sole purpose
of frustrating the secured lender," may be given more weight than an admission
that "the debtor has no equity in the property" because the debtor's equity in the
property is an objective measurement that can be more easily (if not more
203
accurately) determined than a debtor's subjective intent.
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF WAIVERS
Although the legitimacy of waivers of the automatic stay is in doubt,
persuasive arguments exist to permit such waivers. Three independent
rationales, in fact, support the validity of these waivers: (1) encouragement of
private workouts; (2) freedom of contract; and (3) privatization of the debtor
creditor relationship in a way that resolves the common pool problem.
A. The Encouragement of Private Workouts
Courts have given substantial weight to encouraging out-of-court
workouts. The Code itself recognizes that filing a bankruptcy petition is not
always the most efficient means of restructuring the relationship between a
debtor and its creditors. 204 The House Report states that "[m]ost business
arrangements, that is, extension of composition (reduction) of debts, occur outof-court. The out-of-court procedure, sometimes known as common law
composition, is quick and inexpensive." 205 As the court in Club Tower stated:
Workouts and restructuring should be encouraged among debtors and
creditors, particularly where, as here, there is a debt between two parties
199.

Id. at 831.

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 837.
831 F.2d 1292, 1296 (7th Cir. 1987).
In re Jenkins, 181 B.R. 33, 36 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
See Note, supra note 188, at 207.

204.

Section 305(a)(1) states, "(a) The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a

case under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under this title, at any time if(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dismissal or
suspension...." 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1).
205. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 24, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5787.
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and a single asset. Under these circumstances, filing for bankruptcy
should be a last resort. In order to facilitate this goal, prepetition
agreements should be enforced against a borrower who later files for
bankruptcy. To hold otherwise could make lenders more reticent in
attempting workouts with borrowers outside of bankruptcy. 206
In In re Colonial Ford,207 the court recognized that there were at least
three reasons Congress sought to encourage workouts: speed, cost and
sensibility. 20 S Congress designed the Code to permit bankruptcy only as a last
resort. 209 Outside the bankruptcy context, a debtor and its creditors are
removed from the dilatory structure of bankruptcy. They "enjoy a flexibility
conducive to speed."210 This is important to both parties because delay is "the
most costly element in any bankruptcy proceeding and particularly in a business
reorganization. The same amount of money received by a senior creditor four
years from now is worth probably less than half of that same amount of money
received today."211 A second consideration noted by the Colonial Ford court is
the cost benefit of out-of-court workouts. An out-of-court workout avoids the
committees and trustees and the throng of accountants and lawyers advising
them. Moreover, bankruptcy may destroy business relationships necessary for a
successful financial rehabilitation as sales may decline and the cost of obtaining
vital credit may increase. The third consideration is the inherent sensibility of
out-of-court settlements. Workouts often depend on cooperation, participation,
and good faith. Bankruptcy litigation, on the other hand, is an adversarial
process rife with competing zealousness, strategy, and dissension. The parties
themselves are often better prepared than a judge, who often has few resources
and little training, to rehabilitate a financially impaired company. "The
courtroom is not a boardroom. The judge is not a business consultant." 212 An
additional consideration is the crowded dockets of bankruptcy courts. 2 13
Overcrowded dockets encourage judges to enforce these waivers if they are
made by sophisticated parties, especially with the advice of counsel, since
waivers go a long way to promote restructuring without the need for
bankruptcy courts.
B. Freedom of Contract
The Bankruptcy Code contains no explicit provision forbidding waiver of
the right to file a petition for relief.2 14 However, such a waiver has never been

206. In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991). See also,
Note, supra note 188, at 205-06.
207. 24 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
208. Id. at 1016.
209. Id. at 1015.
210. Id. at 1016.
211. Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 490 (1977).
212. In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506,511 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
213. Note, supra note 188, at 209.
214. Section 706(a) provides that any waiver of the right to convert a Chapter 7 case to a
Chapter 11, 12, or 13 case is unenforceable. The legislative history of this section suggests that
a waiver of the right to file a bankruptcy petition is also unenforceable ("The explicit reference in
Title I1 forbidding the waiver of certain rights is not intended to imply that other rights, such as
the right to file a voluntary bankruptcy case under Section 301, may be waived.") H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, supra note 24, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5963, 6458.
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enforced. 215 Since enforcing a debtor's waiver of this right would completely
216
deny access to a "fresh start," public policy strongly opposes such waivers.
This is unquestionably the case if the waiver is obtained when the transaction
was first contemplated, but Thomas Moers Mayer has suggested that this right
is not as firmly embedded in the Code as it seems-such as when the waiver
was obtained from a single-asset real estate debtor in the course of a workout
218
agreement. 217 He cites United States v. Royal Business Funds Corp., where

the court held that a debtor who consented to a federal receivership in exchange
for a $4 million loan from the Small Business Administration ("S.B.A.") had no
absolute right to file a bankruptcy petition. The court found it relevant that the
S.B.A. was the only significant creditor, the receiver had been operating the
company for over a year, and the debtor offered no reason for filing.2 19 As
Mayer suggests, the typical single-asset real estate case, though not usually the
subject of a federal receivership or the recipient of a federal loan, is much like
the cited case because a private mortgagee often agrees to forbearance and
advances additional funds in a workout agreement with the
occasionally
debtor. 220
C. Privatization

A common pool problem exists when self-interested individuals act in a
way that leads to a less than socially optimal result. 221 More technically, "a
common pool problem exists when negative production or consumption
externalities caused by the use of exhaustible resources cannot be resolved by
the definition of property rights." 222 In other words, a negative consumption
externality involves a situation where one's consumption limits another's ability
223
to also consume. Returning to our earlier example of fish in a common pond,
each time a fish is caught the pond is diminished for those who might fish later
in the season.
In his celebrated work, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law,
Thomas Jackson contends that one of bankruptcy's central functions, if not its
core function, is to provide a consolidated method of distributing a debtor's
property to creditors in a way which maximizes creditor wealth.224 In other
words, bankruptcy seeks to solve the common pool problem by assuring that
anglers do not rush to deplete the pond for their benefit at the expense of those
215. See In re Club Tower L.P., 138 B.R. 307, 311-12 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991); In re
Tru Block Concrete Prods., Inc., 27 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (agreement not to
seek bankruptcy relief not enforceable).
216. McFarland, supra note 15, at 17; see also Bassin, supra note 18, at 10.
217. Thomas M. Mayer, Bankruptcy-ProofEntities, Bankruptcy-Resistant Workouts, and
Tolling Agreements, Section llI(A)(1) (page number unavailable), 402 PLI/REAL 37 (PLI Order
No. N4-4585 (1994)).
218. 724 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983).

219.

Id. at 16.

220.

Mayer, supranote 217, at Section III(A)(1) (page number unavailable).

221.

THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 10 n.9, 12-

14 (1986) (describing common pool problems and situations in which each individual is
motivated by self-interest).
222. Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifyingthe Common PoolAnalogy
as Applied to the Standardfor Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337,
369-70 (1993).
223. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
224. JACKSON, supra note 221, at 4, 14, 53, 128, 210, 212-13.
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who come later. At least in part, this notion of preserving the common pool for
the benefit of all is premised on the hypothesis that all anglers are individually
benefitted by a policy which prevents depletion of a natural resource. Or, as
Jackson might contend, bankruptcy seeks to prevent the dismemberment of a
debtor's property because often the debtor's property, taken as a whole, has a
value which exceeds that of the sum of its individual parts. The automatic stay
plays a prominant role in solving the common pool problem by preventing one
or more creditors from depleting the assets of the debtor's estate to the
detriment of the other creditors and the value of the estate as a whole.
In the instant context, Jackson's treatment of ipso facto clauses-clauses
which provide, for example, that a debtor is in immediate default if it declares
bankruptcy-is particularly interesting. Although he acknowledges that such
clauses may be justified because the lender often bargains and pays for these
clauses in the form of a lower interest rate, he believes the predominant
difficulty with arguments in favor of such clauses is that they
assumed that the debtor bears the costs of this clause. An aspect of the
problem of diverse ownership, however, exists here. These clauses would
have an effect on a reorganization (where acceleration is not the order of
the day) and might harm the remaining unsecured creditors by requiring
them to pay for a (secured) claim at its face amount instead of its
unaccelerated present value worth. The group that is likely to bear the
costs of this clause in bankruptcy, accordingly, is not the debtor (or its
shareholders) but the other creditors. Thus, the debtor may have no
particular incentive in negotiating loans to exclude such clauses, and
other creditors may have no effective way of forcing the debtor to
exclude them. It may be preferable, therefore, to refuse to recognize
clauses negotiated by the debtor whose impact will be felt almost
exclusively by other creditors, notwithstanding their possible
prophylactic role, because they have effect only upon insolvency (or
22
similar occurrence).m
From Jackson's objections to ipso facto clauses, we might anticipate that
he would also object to prepetition waivers in a multiple creditor scenario
because their "impact [would likely].. .be felt almost exclusively by other
creditors."2 2 6 As he might contend, the principal problem with these clauses is
that the debtor might have no incentive to negotiate with a dominant creditor to
exclude such a clause, and yet the other creditors bear all the risk of such a
clause's inclusion.
Cognizant of Jackson's likely objections, we acknowledge the valuable
role that the automatic stay plays in preventing dismemberment of the debtor's
estate and the limited incentive, or leverage, the debtor may have to prevent the
imposition of such clauses. We also agree that creditors may have little, if any,
ability to influence a debtor's decision to accept such clauses and yet bear many
of the risks inherent in their adoption. That being said, however, we do not
believe that a blanket prohibition on the enforceability of these clauses is
appropriate. Rather, we advocate the judicial acceptance of these clauses in
situations where there has been a privatization of the common pool problem
between the debtor and a creditor. What do we mean by this? Consider the
following example.
225.

Id. at 42-43 (footnotes omitted).
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Suppose Debtor X is an entity that owns a large real estate property in
the state of Arizona. Suppose also that Debtor X has only one creditor, Creditor
Y, and that Debtor X is in default with respect to an outstanding obligation to
Creditor Y. Suppose finally that Debtor X has no equity in the asset at issue. At
a meeting to discuss the default, Creditor Y proposes forebearance with regard
to its immediate remedies under the loan agreement in exchange for Debtor X's
agreement to waive its right to the automatic stay should Debtor X seek
bankruptcy relief.
In this case, facing a severe financial crisis, Debtor X is likely to agree to
such a proposal. If Debtor X does agree, why is that a problem, we might ask?
Debtor X's agreement is certainly not problematic from the perspective of the
common pool problem because there are no other creditors who have an
interest in sharing in the pool of the debtor's assets. Put in other terms, the
parties have privatized the common pool problem because there are no other
parties with an interest or stake in Debtor X's assets. Because the costs attendant
to the decision to waive the automatic stay by Debtor X are borne solely by
Debtor X, the cost-benefit analysis of such a decision is thrust quite
appropriately into the hands of the proper party. That being said, we conclude
there is a persuasive argument for upholding the validity of waivers of the
automatic stay in cases such as single asset real estate scenarios, where there is
but one creditor and one debtor.
Of course, we readily acknowledge that our conclusion changes if a
debtor has more than one creditor, unless all the creditors individually agree to
permit the debtor to waive its right to an automatic stay. In that situation,
where all the anglers have agreed to a fishing free-for-all, we see little reason
to interfere. Some might contend that permitting waivers in the multiple
creditor scenario, or where the debtor has some equity in the collateral, or
where the entity itself might have a going concern value which likely exceeds
its liquidation value and which is likely to inure to the benefit of the debtor, is
inappropriate. We disagree. If all the creditors agree to a race to dismember,
why should we interfere if they feel that is a superior mechanism for asset
distribution to the formal procedures prescribed by the Bankruptcy Code? As
to protecting the debtor's residual interest, we see no reason to interfere with a
debtor's decision to forego its interest in exchange for creditor forbearance. To
engage in paternal oversight of debtors, who are often quite sophisticated,
makes little sense in this setting. Moreover, it is in the nature of business to be
exposed to and to accept risk. To allow a debtor to reap the upside rewards of a
business venture while eluding the risks of failure is inconsistent with the
notions underlying a basic free market economy.
V. PRACTICAL CONCERNS REGARDING WAIVERS
In considering the advisability of utilizing a prepetition waiver of the
automatic stay, the creditor's and debtor's concerns clearly diverge. Therefore,
such considerations must be contemplated separately.
A. Creditor Issues
When thinking about the advisability of such a stipulation from the
perspective of a creditor, the distinctions between the different types of
agreements must be weighed. If a creditor enters into a self-executing waiver,
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she must be aware of the fact that most bankruptcy courts appear to agree that
waivers of the automatic stay are not self-executing-that is, that creditors must
apply to the court for relief 22 7 Section 362(d) empowers the bankruptcy court
to grant stay relief to a "party in interest" if "cause" exists to do so, after notice
and a hearing. Since the Code does not define "cause," it is highly likely that
regardless of how the stipulation is drafted, the matter will end up before a
tribunal which will determine whether cause exists to grant leave from the stay.
As a consequence, it is advisable for creditors to draft stipulations which agree
to a waiver in addition to acknowledgments and facts that will provide grounds
for relief from the stay.
Additionally, if a creditor has a carefully drafted prepetition stipulation,
the agreement itself may provide the creditor with in-hand evidence of the
character of the debtor's conduct in filing a subsequent bankruptcy petition.
Moreover, even if the agreement is held to be unenforceable, the stipulation can
still assist the court in judging
the debtor's conduct and facilitate the court's
"good faith" determination.2 28
Generally, it is advisable for a creditor to include the following when
drafting a prebankruptcy workout and restructuring agreement:
- The lender shall be entitled to immediate relief from the automatic stay
to permit enforcement of its rights and remedies under the loan
documents and applicable state law;
- The borrower consents to the immediate termination of the automatic
stay and agrees not to contest any motion filed by lenders for such;
- The borrower agrees that the exclusive period for it to file a plan in
bankruptcy and seek acceptances of the plan will terminate on a given
date, without extension; and
- The borrower admits the existence of certain facts that will support an
order dismissing the case or terminating the automatic stay.2 29
Finally, it is notable that Peter Partee implies that it may be malpractice
not to include a provision granting a creditor a waiver
of the automatic stay in
230
the event that the borrower files for bankruptcy.
Even though the benefits a creditor may receive as a result of a
prepetition waiver of the automatic stay are apparent, there are negative factors
that may result from the use of such a stipulation. First, when considering a
prepetition waiver, the court may be left with the impression that the creditor
has been overreaching on the insistence of the provision. This could certainly
taint the creditor's stance in the entire case, which could lead to the
subordination of the lender's claim or subject the creditor to a lender liability
claim. Secondly, should the waiver of the automatic stay be considered a breach
of the debtor's fiduciary duty, a lender may run the risk of a claim for aiding
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and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.23' A third potential risk a creditor may
run by entering into a prepetition waiver is that a debtor may argue that at the
time the agreement was executed, the circumstances under which the filing
occurred were never contemplated. The debtor might make the argument to
escape the effect of a prepetition stipulation. 23 2 Similarly, because the court
may look at the debtor's present conduct and the circumstances under which the
petition is filed, the debtor may argue "change of circumstances" in attempting
to justify its subsequent filing and prove to the court that it is a debtor worthy
of the rehabilitative protection of Chapter 11.233
B. Debtor Issues
In considering the advisability of a prepetition waiver of the automatic
stay from the debtor's viewpoint, several points become evident. While a court
may be unlikely to hold that an agreement may be per se enforceable, such an
234
agreement does hamper defending a motion for relief from stay.
Additionally, as mentioned in the discussion on creditor issues, the waiver of
the automatic stay may be considered a breach of fiduciary duty owed by an
insolvent debtor to its creditors. 235 It is important to remember that a
bankruptcy court may consider a covenant when determining whether to
dismiss a bankruptcy case as a bad faith filing. 236 This provision provides
evidence to a court that the debtor has already had the benefit from the
creditor's prepetition consensual forbearance that a bankruptcy case would have
afforded it.237 Finally, it might be wise, in some cases, for the debtor's attorney
to consider the prospect of a filing earlier than one normally would, for the
238
purpose of testing the enforceability of such prepetition waivers.
CONCLUSION
Creditors in these cases have had ample justification for seeking
prepetition waivers and stipulations. Most of these decisions involve single-asset
real estate debtors. If the secured creditor has no equity cushion protection and
the property's income is not meeting its expenses, the creditor needs to act
quickly to limit losses. On the other hand, as the court pointed out in Jenkins, a
single-asset real estate debtor loses all hope of reorganization when the secured
creditor is allowed to foreclose on the property. 239 Allowing the stay to be
lifted without a factual inquiry seems to be an abdication of the court's
responsibility to treat the debtor fairly.
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Congress recognized this conflict in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
and tried to forge a compromise. These revisions to the Code streamlined many
bankruptcy procedures. Sections 101 and 218 of the 1994 Act both amend 11
U.S.C. § 362 to expedite automatic stay hearings. Section 101 of the Act
amended 11 U.S.C. § 362(e) to require that the final hearing of a motion to lift
the automatic stay be concluded thirty days after the preliminary hearing.
Under the old statute, the final hearing needed only to commence within thirty
days of the preliminary hearing. Section 218 of the Act amended 11 U.S.C. §§
101 and 362(d) to create a new category of property and give creditors new
rights to foreclose on it. Section 218 provides:
"single asset real estate" means real property constituting a single
property or project other than residential real property with fewer than
four residential units, which generates substantially all of the gross
income of a debtor and on which no substantial business is being
conducted by a debtor other than the business of operating the real
property and activities incidental thereto having aggregate
noncontingent, liquidated secured debts in an amount no more than
$4,000,000.
Section 218 of the 1994 Act also created 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3), which
allows creditors of single asset real estate to have the stay lifted if (A) the
debtor has not filed a "feasible" reorganization plan within ninety days of
filing, or (B) the debtor has not commenced monthly payments to secured
creditors in an amount equal to interest at a current fair market rate on the
value of the creditor's interest in the real estate.
With the revisions in § 362, a secured lender's need to extract prepetition
waivers and admissions is reduced. In the single asset real estate case, the
burden of proof has been shifted to the debtor: the stay expires in ninety days
unless the debtor acts to protect the creditor's interest. A creditor no longer
needs to show cause or lack of good faith. In all cases, the final hearing must
now conclude within thirty days of the preliminary hearing.
These amendments to the Code forge a fair compromise. Limiting the
single asset real estate category to property worth less than $4 million allows
the court to expedite the less complex cases and grant relief to the creditor
more quickly. Also, the duration of the benefit the debtor receives from the
automatic stay is limited so that a bad faith filing is not likely to cause the
secured lender as large a financial loss. And for the single asset real estate
debtor who files in good faith, ninety days of breathing space is provided to
fashion a reorganization plan or commence payments.
Despite these changes, at present there remain several unanswered
questions. First, debtors may have an enforceable fiduciary duty to all of their
creditors. 240 A debtor may breach that duty by granting a waiver to one
creditor thereby giving her preference over the others. Lenders' counsel
assisting in this breach of fiduciary duty could face penalties. 241 On the other
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hand, lenders' counsel
could face malpractice charges for not recommending
the use of a waiver. 242
Second, "rubber stamp" enforcement of waivers could create a moral
hazard problem. Most debtors, whether commercial or consumer, probably do
not anticipate filing bankruptcy. Thus, most debtors would probably be willing
to waive the automatic stay for immediate gains. However, widespread waiving
of the stay could make bankruptcy obsolete for certain classes of debtors.
Without the automatic stay, bankruptcy would be of little use because creditors
could pursue their remedies against the debtor. 243 Such a result is not likely
under the current state of the law, but this and other concerns certainly obviate
the necessity of limiting waivers to those situations which do not seriously
impair the Code's underlying policies.
As the waiver cases demonstrate, the courts walk a fine line between
competing policy goals. To prevent stepping too far over that line, courts
should consider at least two factors before enforcing a waiver and promoting
certain policies: first, the context in which a waiver will have any validity
whatsoever, and second, the width that should be given a waiver in determining
whether "cause" exists to lift the stay.
Because the case law on this topic varies so widely, the precise
circumstances under which stipulations are enforceable are uncertain. The fact
that such provisions lead to out-of-court settlements would seemingly lead the
courts to enforce such provisions. However, it cannot be forgotten that the
underlying policy of providing debtors with a chance to reorganize while
preserving the estate for creditors exists, as does the potential for bad faith
filings on behalf of debtors to avoid or hinder creditors' recovery. The
emerging consensus is that a court should consider the waiver as one factor
when deciding whether to lift the stay. Considering the recent amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code, secured creditors need not be as fearful that their
interests will be depreciated by drawn out lift-stay proceedings, so reliance on
prepetition waivers and stipulations is no longer as crucial.
While it is unclear whether relief-from-stay provisions will be upheld in
the future, the best case for their enforcement is the workout situation where
consideration, such as forbearance, is clearly established, where few other
creditors have or may assert significant claims against the debtor, and where
there is no equity in the property in excess of the outstanding loan balance. 244
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